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Abstract
We study the e¤ects of deposit insurance and observability of previous actions on the emergence of
bank runs by means of a controlled laboratory experiment. We consider three depositors in the line of
a bank, who decide between withdrawing or keeping their money deposited. We have three treatments
with di¤erent levels of deposit insurance which reect the losses a depositor may incur in the case of
a bank run. We nd that di¤erent levels of deposit insurance and the possibility of observing other
depositorsactions a¤ect the likelihood of bank runs. When decisions are not observable, higher levels
of deposit insurance decrease the probability of bank runs. When decisions are observable, this need not
to be the case. These results suggest that (i) observability might be considered as a partial substitute
of deposit insurance, and that (ii) the optimal deposit insurance should take into account the degree of
observability (JEL Codes : G21, C90)
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates how deposit insurance and observability of previous actions a¤ect the emergence of
bank runs by means of a controlled laboratory experiment. In 2007, the run on the English bank Northern
Rock heralded the recent nancial turmoil. This bank su¤ered massive withdrawals within days despite that
bank deposits in the UK were insured. Other nancial institutions like the Washington Mutual, Country-
widebank or the IndyMac Bank in the US, or the Bank of East Asia in Hong Kong also have experienced
bank runs. Media coverage that made observable the lines in front of the bank o¢ ces might have contributed
to the protraction of the runs.
Deposit insurance is regarded as one of the pillars of modern nancial safety nets. The main objective of
deposit insurance is to protect depositors who cannot generally make an informed assessment of the risk that
the bank to which their funds are entrusted may fail. During the recent crisis, one of the public aims has
been to maintain the condence in the nancial intermediation and to avoid runs on banks without problems
with the fundamentals. To this purpose, the level of deposit insurance has been increased worldwide. In the
US, the deposit insurance changed from covering the rst $100.000 to the rst $250.000 in 2008. In the
EU, the new Directive 2009/14/EC protects the rst e100.000, in contrast with a minimum of 90% of the
rst e20.000 protected by the previous Directive. In the UK, deposit insurance covered 100% of the rst
£ 2.000 and 90% of the rst £ 35.000 by the time of the run on Northern Rock. Several changes since then
increased the limit until 100% of the rst £ 85.000. These measures have been reinforced by some governments
announcing an implicit unlimited protection to the deposits. Given the size of the bank system, the increase
in the deposit insurance limits supposes the assumption of huge risks. Clearly, analyzing the e¤ectiviness of
di¤erent levels of deposit insurance would help policymakers to design adequate measures to prevent runs.
Descriptions of bank runs episodes (e.g. Sprague 1910; Wicker 2001; Bruner and Carr 2007) suggest that
people are more likely to withdraw their deposits after observing that others did it as well. Empirical studies
also support the idea that many depositors have information about what other depositors have done and
react to this information. Kelly and O Grada (2000) examine the behavior of depositors during the panics
of 1854 and 1857 in New York. The depositors were mostly Irish immigrants, and the county of origin in
Ireland was the most important factor in whether they withdrew or not. The authors explain this result
arguing that immigrants from the same county tended to cluster in neighborhoods of their own, making their
decisions "observable" (i.e., when they decided to withdraw, others from the same county got information
about it and prompted the observers to follow suit). Starr and Yilmaz (2007) use detailed data provided by
a bank that su¤ered a run in Turkey in 2001. The authors group depositors according to their deposit size
and study how the behavior of these groups depended on previous withdrawal hikes. They show that the
3
behavior of depositor groups of di¤erent sizes was responsive to actions of their peers, but not always to the
observable behavior of depositors of other groups. In a recent study, Iyer and Puri (2011) investigate the
underlying reasons for a run that a¤ected an Indian bank in 2001. Their results highlight that a depositors
likelihood to run is increasing in the fraction of other people in his/her social network that have run. Overall,
these studies make clear that understanding how observability inuences the existence of bank runs is also
of rst order importance.
We design an experiment to study how di¤erent levels of deposit insurance and observability of actions
a¤ect the emergence of bank runs. The lack of detailed data about depositors behavior in real-world
situations complicates the analysis of these issues. Carrying out laboratory experiments that mimick bank
runs may be a useful way to shed light on the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent levels of deposit insurance, given
various degrees of observability of depositors behavior. Laboratory experiments are uniquely suitable to
address this question: by carefully manipulating the information that subjects receive, it is possible to study
how depositors react to this information, avoiding the e¤ect of other variables and focusing our attention on
the e¤ect of di¤erent levels of deposit insurance.
We study bank runs using a coordination game that follows the spirit of Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
There are three depositors lining up at a bank, in which earlier they deposited their endowments of 40
monetary units (MU). Depositors are randomly assigned a position (that is made known to them). This
position determines the order in which depositors choose between waiting or withdrawing their money from
the bank.1 Each depositor knows her own liquidity needs, which is private information. Following the
literature, we consider two types of depositors. There is an impatient depositor who has an immediate need
for funds and always withdraws her deposit. The other two depositors are patient, so they do not need their
money urgently and decide whether to withdraw their funds from the bank or to keep them deposited.
Whether the other depositorsdecisions are observable is determined by the position in the sequence and
the informational setup. In this paper, we focus on two setups: the simultaneous and the sequential one.
In the simultaneous setup depositors do not have any information about what other depositors have done
whereas in the sequential setup each previous decision is observable and depositors acting early are aware
that their decisions will be observed.
In the experiment, the impatient depositor is simulated by the computer and is forced to withdraw. The
patient depositors choose between waiting or withdrawing during 15 rounds, with variation of information
1We use "keeping the money deposited" and "waiting" in an interchangeable manner. The assumption about the perfect
knowledge of the position and positions being exogeously determined is often considered in theoretical models (Andolfatto et
al 2007; Green and Lin 2003; Ennis and Keister 2009).
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and position in each round. If both of the patient depositors decide to wait, they receive the highest possible
payo¤(70 MU). Withdrawal yields a lower, but a still relatively high payo¤(50 MU) to the rst two depositors
who decide to withdraw, regardless of her liquidity needs.2 The payo¤ for a depositor that withdraws after
two withdrawals is 20 MU. Deposit insurance becomes relevant when a patient depositor waits alone. In this
case, we consider three possible payo¤s which correspond to three di¤erent treatments. When there is no
insurance, the patient depositor who waits alone receives a payo¤ of 20 MU which is as low as the payo¤ she
would receive upon withdrawal once the other two depositors have withdrawn.3 In the case of low insurance,
the patient depositor who waits alone receives a payo¤ (30 MU) that is lower than the initial endowment and
lower than the payo¤ to the rst two withdrawing depositors. Nevertheless, it is higher than the payo¤ in
the no-insurance case. In the high insurance case, a depositor who waits alone receives her initial endowment
(40 MU). Hence, when there exists high insurance a patient depositor cannot lose money compared with
the initial endowment, but still the rst and second depositors who withdraw receive a higher payo¤. Given
these payo¤s, bank runs can be approached as a coordination problem, meaning that a patient depositor
prefers to wait if the other patient depositor does it as well (Diamond and Dybvig 1983).
We dene a bank run as a situation in which at least one of the patient depositors withdraws. While
previous experiments study how the likelihood of bank runs varies as the level of deposit insurance changes,
ours allows also for variation in observability. This new dimension is shown to be relevant since depositors
choices may be a¤ected by other depositors decisions as testied by our experiment. The possibility of
observing early withdrawals may spark o¤ a bank run despite high levels of deposit insurance. Though,
if early depositors are observed to keep the money in the bank, bank runs would be less likely to occur.
Our experimental data is in line with the latter hypothesis. We show that observability plays a role in
the emergence of bank runs as the sequential setup decreases signicantly the likelihood of bank runs with
respect to the case of simultaneous decisions. As expected, deposit insurance is also important in reducing
the likelihood of bank runs since both low and high insurance decrease the likelihood of bank runs in any of
the two setups.
When investigating the interplay between the di¤erent levels of insurance and observability we nd
that their e¤ects are not independent. If decisions are not simultaneous but sequential, deposit insurance
decreases the likelihood of bank runs, but the e¤ects of high and low insurance in our experiment are not
signicantly di¤erent. This is the main contribution of the paper, since it is shown that the e¤ectiveness
of di¤erent levels of deposit insurance depends on the degree of observability, a nding that is absent in
2The rationale for this payo¤ is that depositors receive their initial endowment (40 MU) plus an interesent rate (10 MU).
3Since the bank starts with 340= 120 MU, after two withdrawals that yield 50 MU, the bank has only 20 MU to be paid
to the depositor who waits.
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the literature. This fact has potentially important policy implications. Lately, many scholars have argued
that the moral hazard associated to deposit insurance may do more harm than the benets it gives. Moral
hazard arises under deposit insurance because it lowers market discipline on bank risk taking. In this vein,
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) nd that weaknesses in the deposit insurance arrangement increase
the likelihood that a country will experince a banking distress. Since deposit insurance and observability
are found to be partial substitute, our results suggest that bank runs can be prevented with a lower level
of deposit insurance in environments characterized by high level of observability. Thus, the policymakers
should investigate the degree of observability to design the optimal deposit insurance. For instance, if the
policymaker considers that on-line banks decrease observability, then the level of deposit insurance for those
institutions should be increased. The contrary is true if the level of observability is high (e.g., media reports
extensively on nancial issues or banks operate in a transparent way that makes information about other
depositorsdecision available).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the relevant literature and
relate it to our ndings. In Section 3 we present the experimental design. We report our results in Section
4. Section 5 concludes and discusses our ndings.
2 Related literature
Two of the main features of our paper are that bank runs are modeled as a coordination problem and that
depositors are able to observe other depositorsdecisions. Although the worsening of fundamental variables
is an important explanation for the occurrence of bank runs (e.g. Gorton 1988), there exists evidence for
the importance of coordination problems as well (e.g. Calomiris and Mason 2003). The seminal paper in
this literature is Diamond and Dybvig (1983) who use a simultaneous-move framework to show that bank
runs can emerge as an equilibrium outcome. Most of the theoretical literature builds on the assumption of
simultaneous decisions with the exception of a very few papers that have recently incorporated the idea of
observability of actions. Ennis and Keister (2011), for instance, consider that depositors observe withdrawals
as they occur. Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara and Rosa-Garcia (2009) do also allow for the possibility of observing
other depositors actions by considering a social network that channels information.4 Our experimental
data suggest that observability might foster coordination and avoid bank runs. We then provide evidence
supporting the idea to incorporate observability into the theoretical models.
4Gu (2011) is another paper that incorporates the idea of observability. She focuses on a signal extraction problem in which
depositors try to nd out whether their bank has fundamental problems or not, so she leaves aside the idea of modeling bank
runs as a coordination problem.
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Our paper is also related to the literature on deposit insurance. The central issue in deposit insurance
design is to strike the right balance between the benets of avoiding crises (e.g. preventing wasteful re sale
of bank assets) and the costs of controlling bank risk taking (the moral hazard problem). This literature
identies partial insurance as an important element of good design (Demirgüc-Kunt, Kane and Laeven 2008),
and states that high level of insurance lowers market discipline (Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga 2004). Our
contribution to this literature is to point out that the optimal level of deposit insurance should take into
account the degree of observability. This factor should be considered along others already identied by the
literature for the optimal level of deposit insurance, such as the stage of development of the nancial system,
the macroeconomic conditions, or the political environment (for more details see Demirgüc-Kunt, Kane and
Laeven 2008).
The experimental literature on bank runs studies factors that most favor or prevent them. This literature
singles out deposit insurance as an important element that might prevent bank runs. Madies (2006) nds in
a simultaneous-move framework that partial deposit insurance neither prevents nor stops the propagation of
bank runs, as even depositors with a 75% insurance do not behave di¤erently from uninsured depositors. In
Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009), depositors observe the number of depositors that have withdrawn and the
amount that has been withdrawn. In this setup that allows observability, deposit insurance guaranteeing 50%
of the initial deposit helps to decrease the occurrence of bank runs, whereas the 20% insurance level does not
a¤ect depositorsbehavior compared with the no-insurance case. In contrast to Madies (2006), we nd that
higher level of insurance leads to less bank runs in the simultaneous setup. Our ndings support Schotter
and Yorulmazer (2009) in the sequential setup as partial insurance e¤ectively lowers the likelihood of bank
runs.5 Our contribution is to show that observability might be considered as a partial substitute of deposit
insurance, so that optimal deposit insurance should take into account the degree of observability. This
nding goes one step further than the empirical evidence provided by Iyer and Puri (2011), who highlight
the importance of deposit insurance and observability of actions. The authors show that deposit insurance
is partially e¤ective and observability a¤ects the propagation of bank runs, but they do not analyze the
interplay between the two.
5The rest of papers that investigate bank runs as coordination problems in the lab (Arifovic, Jiang and Xu 2010; Garratt
and Keister 2009; Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara and Rosa-Garcia 2009; Klos and Sträter 2011), do not consider the role of deposit
insurance.
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3 Experimental Design
A total of 192 students were recruited from the undergraduate population of the Universidad de Alicante.
Students had no (or very little) prior exposure to game theory. The experiment was conducted at the
Laboratory of Theoretical and Experimental Economics (LaTEx), using the experimental software z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007). The laboratory consists of 24 computers in separate cubicles and any form of commu-
nication between subjects was strictly forbidden.
We used a between-subject design and ran a total of 8 sessions, which correspond to three di¤erent
treatments as detailed below. In each session, instructions were read aloud. We let subjects ask about
any doubts they may have had before starting the experiment.6 The average length of each session was 45
minutes. Subjects received on average 12 Euros for participating, including the show-up fee of 4 euros.
In each session, subjects were divided into two matching groups of 12. Subjects from di¤erent matching
groups never interacted with each other throughout the session. Within the same matching group, subjects
were randomly and anonymously matched in pairs at the beginning of each round. Each of these pairs was
assigned a third depositor, simulated by the computer so as to create a three-depositor bank in each round.
Subjects knew that one of the depositors in the bank was simulated by the computer.
In each session, the three depositors played a coordination problem for 15 rounds. In each round,
depositors invested an initial endowment of e = 40 monetary units (MU) in the bank.7 Then, they were
randomly assigned a position in the sequence of decisions and asked to decide consecutively, as if they were
in the line of a bank. Subjects knew their position in the line. It was known that the the computer was
programmed to withdraw always, regardless of the position in the sequence. The subjects were allowed
to decide between waiting or withdrawing in each round. Before making this decision, depositors possibly
observed previous decisions within the same round and they knew whether they would be observed by
subsequent depositors. In the experiment, we considered di¤erent information structures in each round.8
6The instructions for the experiment are originally in Spanish. A translated version is available in the web Appendix.
7We used Spanish pesetas as experimental currency. The reason for this design choice is twofold. First, it mitigates integer
problems, compared with other currencies (USD or euros, for example). On the other hand, although Spanish pesetas are no
longer in use, Spanish people still use pesetas to express monetary values in their everyday life. In this respect, by using a
"real" currency we avoid the problem of framing the incentive structure of the experiment using a scale (e.g., "experimental
currency") with no cognitive content.
8Subjects faced a di¤erent problem in each round. We studied all informational setups that may arise with three depositors,
so we also had structures with partial information. For instance, depositor 3 may know what depositor 2 has done but she may
have no information about depositor 1s decision. Results for the partial environments are similar to those discussed and are
available upon request. An interesting question is whether subjects faced each round as a "new game" or they learnt how to
play. The Chow test reveals that subjects did not behave di¤erently in the second half (rounds 8 to 15) of the experiment.
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To describe depositorspayo¤s, let yi 2 f0; 1g for i = 1; 2; 3 denote the decision of depositor in position
i, where 0 denotes keeping the money in the bank and 1 indicates withdrawal. We denote as ci1 depositor is
payo¤ upon withdrawal and ci0 the payo¤ if she waits. If a depositor decides to withdraw, she receives her
payo¤ immediately. Payo¤ upon withdrawal is ci1 = 50 for i 2 f1; 2g, and for i = 3 it is
c31 =
8<: c1 = 50 if
P
j 6=3 y
j < 2
c11 = 20 if
P
j 6=3 y
j = 2
:
In words, if depositor 1 or 2 withdraws, she receives c1 = 50: This amount corresponds to the depositors
initial endowment (e = 40) plus an interest rate of 10 MU. If depositor 3 withdraws, she receives c31 = 50 if
she is the rst or second withdrawing depositor. If depositor 3 withdraws after two withdrawals, then she
gets the remaining funds in the bank (c11 = 3e  2c1 = 20) which is less than her initial endowment.
If a depositor chooses to keep the money in the bank, she has to wait until everybody has decided. If
both subjects wait, then each of them receives 70 MU. Deposit insurance becomes e¤ective if there is only
one depositor who decides to wait.9 We study three levels of insurance. In the case of no insurance (NO)
the depositor lacks any protection and receives the residual funds the bank has after two withdrawals (20
MU). We ran two sessions with this treatment (48 subjects). In the case of low insurance (LOW ) the only
depositor who decides to keep her funds deposited receives a higher payo¤ (30 MU), but this payo¤ is still
smaller than her initial endowment. We ran two sessions with this treatment as well (48 subjects). High
insurance (HIGH ) means that a depositor who chooses to wait cannot lose money, so she receives 40 MU.10
Four sessions were run with this treatment (96 subjects). Payo¤s for any subject i 2 f1; 2; 3g who decides
to wait are:
ci0 =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
c00 = 70 if
P
j 6=i y
j = 1
cNO01 = 20 if
P
j 6=i y
j = 2
cLOW01 = 30 if
P
j 6=i y
j = 2
cHIGH01 = 40 if
P
j 6=i y
j = 2
;
where the rst symbol (0) in the subscript shows that depositor i waits, while the second symbol denotes
the other subjects decision. Superscripts stand for the treatment.
Payo¤s resemble the ex ante optimal contract in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and allow for coordination
problems, satisfying the following relations:
c00 > c1 > e  cD01  c11;
9 In the experiment we did not use the word "deposit insurance". See the Instructions in the web Appendix for further
details.
10Note that we are always considering the case of a partial insurance because the accrued interest rates are not protected.
The same design is implemented in Madies (2006) and Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009).
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where D 2 fNO;LOW;HIGHg represents the level of deposit insurance.11 A key element is that when
depositors decide, they know their position but they may not be sure of the payo¤ they will receive. For
instance, imagine a subject in position 2 who observes a withdrawal. She does not observe whether the
withdrawal was due to the other subject or the computer. In the rst case, the maximum payo¤ she may
receive is 50 MU whereas in the latter case she may obtain 70 MU depending on the decision of depositor 3.
Similarly, if depositor 3 in the simultaneous setup decides to withdraw, she does not know whether she will
receive c1 = 50 or c11 = 20.
We dene a bank run as a situation in which at least two withdrawals occur. This is the broadest
denition, according to which a withdrawal due to a subject (other than the computer) already constitutes a
bank run.12 Hereafter, we study how deposit insurance and observability a¤ect the likelihood of bank runs.
In the simultaneous setup, subjects knew their position but were not aware of predecessors actions. In the
sequential setup subjects knew the decisions of their predecessors and that their decision would be observed
by subsequent subjects. The fact that decisions are observable in the sequential setup is in line with the
empirical evidence presented in the introduction, which also suggests that (i) depositors react quick to this
information (e.g., Starr and Yilmaz 2007) and that (ii) the banks assets available to pay o¤ depositors may
decline faster than observability reveals withdrawals (i.e., the bank in our experiment cannot pay 50 MU to
all depositors who decide to withdraw). Our payo¤s then have the same structure as in Garratt and Keister
(2009) Schotter an Yorulmazer (2009).
4 Experimental Evidence
In this section we analyze the data gathered during the experimental sessions. The main results and insights
are summarized in Table 1. In this table, we report the relative frequency of bank runs in each treatment. We
present the data for both the simultaneous and the sequential setup separately. The number of observations
appears in brackets.
11Since Green and Lin (2003) part of the theoretical literature has focused on the design of incentive compatible contracts
that prevent bank runs. These contracts require that the bank should know the depositors utility function. This condition
cannot be met in a lab experiment. Instead, we take a contract that allows for the coordination problem in Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) and study whether the likelihood of bank runs is a¤ected by the level of deposit insurance and the degree of
observability.
12Bank runs might be also thought as a situation in which "too many" withdrawals take place in a "short" period of time.
Our model does not consider this option since we follow the literature in which only the number of withdrawals (and not its
speed) matters.
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Table 1
We observe that di¤erent levels of deposit insurance a¤ect the likelihood of bank runs in a di¤erent
way. Table 1 shows that deposit insurance reduces the relative frequency of bank runs, as this frequency is
higher when there is no insurance both in the simultaneous and the sequential setup. Other insight is that
observability has a crucial e¤ect, since bank runs are less likely in the sequential setup except for the case of
high insurance. In fact, the third important nding is that the e¤ect of observability and deposit insurance
are not independent. Although low and high insurance a¤ect di¤erently the likelihood of bank runs in the
simultaneous setup, it does not seem to be the case in the sequential one. More precisely, we see that the
relative frequency of bank runs in the simultaneous setup decreases, as the level of insurance increases. It
does not happen in the sequential case, in which increasing the level of insurance from low to high does not
help to reduce the relative frequency of bank runs.13
In order to clarify the e¤ects of deposit insurance and observability, we estimate a logit model in which
the dependent variable is the probability of bank run. The dummy variables LOW and HIGH, take the
value 1 when there exists low and high insurance respectively, being 0 otherwise. We dene SEQ as a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if the setup is sequential, and it is 0 if it is simultaneous. We propose the
following specication:
Pr(Bank Run) = F (0+LOWLOW+HIGHHIGH+SEQSEQ+LOWSEQLOWSEQ+HIGHSEQHIGHSEQ)
(1)
where F (z) = ez=(1 + ez) and the variables LOWSEQ and HIGHSEQ capture the interaction e¤ects.
We run equation (1) over a total of 760 observations, which correspond to 760 banks, each of them with
2 subjects and the computer. We report the marginal e¤ects of the di¤erent explanatory variables in the
column (A) of Table 2. In column (B), the marginal e¤ects of low and high insurance in the sequential setup
are reported. The standard errors take into account matching group clustering.
Table 2
The baseline scenario is the simultaneous setup, when there is neither deposit insurance nor information
about other depositorsdecisions. In column (A), rst we look at the e¤ects that deposit insurance and
observability have separately. We observe that when the low insurance is implemented in the simultaneous
setup, the likelihood of bank runs decreases by roughly 35%; whereas the high deposit insurance reduces
13The test of proportion rejects the hypothesis that LOW and HIGH has the same e¤ect in the simultaneous setup (z = 4:985,
p  value = 0:000), but this hypothesis cannot be rejected when decisions are sequential (z = 0:685, p  value = 0:493).
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this likelihood by approximately 60%. We also see that observability reduces the likelihood of bank runs,
since the marginal e¤ect of SEQ is 23%. The fact that all these probabilities are signicantly di¤erent from
zero implies that deposit insurance and observability decrease the likelihood of bank runs. If we test the null
hypothesis that deposit insurance and sequentiality have the same e¤ect on reducing the likelihood of bank
runs, we reject that hypothesis at 5% signicance level. (For the null hypothesis H0 : LOW = SEQ; we get
21 = 5:32 and p value = 0:0211. In the case of the null hypothesis H0 : HIGH = SEQ; we get 21 = 40:80
and p   value = 0:0000:) We also reject the null hypothesis that partial insurance and full insurance are
equally important so as to reduce the likelihood of bank runs (21 = 23:91 and p   value = 0:0000). These
ndings are summarized as follows:
Result 1. Deposit insurance and observability signicantly reduce the likelihood of bank runs. We reject the
hypothesis that these variables have the same e¤ect. More specically, we observe that high insurance
has the largest e¤ect, followed by low insurance and observability.
The literature has shown the importance of deposit insurance to prevent bank runs. Our contribution
is to indicate that observability of actions is also an essential factor in the emergence of bank runs. One
unanswered question in the literature concerns the interplay between deposit insurance and observability.
In column (A) we see that LOWSEQ is not signicantly di¤erent from zero. This indicates that partial
insurance and observability do not have any additional joint e¤ect on reducing the likelihood of bank runs
apart from the e¤ect that these variables have separately (i.e., the combined e¤ect is the summation of both
e¤ects). As a result, we nd that if there exists low insurance (observability), introducing observability
(low insurance) signicantly decreases the likelihood of bank runs (i.e., we reject both the hypothesis that
H0 : SEQ + LOWSEQ = 0 because 21 = 12:85 and p   value = 0:0003; and the hypothesis that H0 :
LOW +LOWSEQ = 0; because 21 = 25:65 and p value = 0:0000). Finally, we also see in column (A) that
the marginal e¤ect of HIGHSEQ is positive and signicantly di¤erent from zero. Therefore, the total e¤ect
of having full insurance and a sequential setup is not just the sum of the individual e¤ects. More precisely,
high insurance has an additional e¤ect on reducing the likelihood of bank runs once observability is in place
(we reject the hypothesis that H0 : HIGH+HIGHSEQ = 0; given that 21 = 29:65 and p value = 0:0000).
However, observability does not have any impact on reducing the likelihood of bank runs if high insurance
already exists (i.e., we cannot reject the hypothesis that H0 : SEQ + HIGHSEQ = 0 at any common
signicance level because 21 = 0:50 and p  value = 0:4774). We summarize these ndings as follows:
Result 2. Once depositors decisions are observable, both low and high insurance have a signicant addi-
tional decreasing e¤ect on the likelihood of bank runs. If we add observability to low insurance, the
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likelihood of bank runs signicantly decreases. Nevertheless, adding observability to high insurance does
not have a signicant e¤ect on the likelihood of bank runs.
This nding suggests that if the level of deposit insurance is low, the higher the degree of observability
the less likely are bank runs.14 The fact that observability is still important when depositors have the
low insurance but it ceases to be relevant when the insurance increases suggests a relationship between the
optimal level of deposit insurance and observability. In the column (B) of Table 2, we study the impact
that both low and high insurance have on the likelihood of bank runs when depositors decide sequentially.
We observe that both levels of deposit insurance decrease this likelihood by roughly 35%. Statistical test
conrms that no signicant di¤erence is observed between the impact of low and high insurance in this setup
(i.e., in the regression Pr(Bank Runj SEQ = 1) = F (0+LOW +HIGH), where z(z) = ez=(1+ez), we fail
to reject the null hypothesis H0 : LOW = HIGH , since 
2
1 = 0:46 and p  value = 0:4774). We summarize
this result as follows:
Result 3. If depositorsdecisions are not observable, high insurance has a di¤erent e¤ect than low insurance
on decreasing the likelihood of bank runs. It is not the case when decisions are observable.
This result is important as it highlights that if nancial intermediation is characterized by an information
structure that allows observability, then there is no need to provide high level of deposit insurance. The
e¤ect of a properly chosen partial insurance cannot be enhanced necessarily by a higher one. It has two
important consequences. On the one hand, in an environment characterized by plentiful information less
insurance is enough to reduce the likelihood of bank runs. On the other hand, these experimental results
suggest that the goal of minimizing the likelihood of bank runs without increasing unnecessarily the moral
hazard caused by the existence of deposit insurance can be achieved, at least when depositors are able to
observe each other.
5 Conclusion
We have studied the e¤ects of deposit insurance and observability on the emergence of bank runs by means
of a controlled laboratory experiment that aims to disentangle the e¤ects of these factors and analyze their
relationship. We nd that when depositorsdecisions are simultaneous, low and high insurance signicantly
14A possible interpretation for this result is that if the deposit insurance is low, bank runs could be curbed if banks reveal to
some extent depositorsactions. We acknowledge, however, that the degree of observability cannot be always controlled as it
depends on the nancial and legal environment.
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decrease the likelihood of bank runs, both levels of deposit insurance having a di¤erent e¤ect. When depos-
itorsdecisions are observable, we do not nd any signicant di¤erence between the e¤ect of low and high
insurance.
Our contribution is to show that (i) observability might be considered as a partial substitute of deposit
insurance, and that (ii) the optimal deposit insurance should take into account the degree of observability.
These ndings have implications for setting the optimal level of deposit insurance. In particular, our data
suggest that an optimal deposit insurance scheme should rely upon the information structure (i.e., the
information that depositors have about other depositors decisions) so that there is no need to provide
high levels of insurance to depositors when the degree of observability is high. In such an environment the
likelihood of bank runs can be reduced without increasing exceedingly the moral hazard implied by high
level of deposit insurance. Thus, if policymakers want to design adequate measures that o¤set moral hazard
and contribute to the nancial stability (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 2002) then more attention should
be paid to investigate the level of observability.
It remains to be discussed, however, whether (and how) an optimal deposit insurance scheme could be
determined as a function of bank-specic observability in the real life. We acknowledge that it is not straight-
forward to address this point. The empirical studies cited earlier highlight the importance of observability of
actions but do not provide a clear measure of it. We consider that the foremost challenge to this literature
may be the current lack of indexes that indicate how depositors communicate with each other. To contribute
to this debate, we would like to point out some features that could be taken into account while constructing
such an index. Consider the case of online and traditional banking. It seems safe to assume that the latter
implies a higher degree of observability, so that it warrants requiring higher deposit insurance for those
banks whose operations are done mostly through their online system.15 The size of the banks could also be
considered as a proxy for the degree of observability as small, local banks, where all depositors belong to the
same community could be protected with a lower level of deposit insurance given that it is more likely that
actions will be observed in that environment. Of course, the dispersion of the population and the existence
of clusters or communities among the clients of the banks should also be considered while accounting for
the level of observability of actions, as suggested by Kelly and O Grada (2002). The type of customers of
each bank is an important factor at stake too. If banks have di¤erent kinds of depositors then the degree of
observability will be probably smaller than if depositors are somehow homogenous. This latter insight is
gleaned from Starr and Yilmaz (2007) where it is found that small depositors are quite responsive to other
15Some of the recent bank runs have been initiated when too many depositors tried to withdraw online their savings, e.g.
when Wachovia faced a silent bank run in 2008.
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small depositorswithdrawal whereas they are only marginally responsive to shocks coming from medium-
size depositors and are unresponsive to large depositorsincreased withdrawal rates. This result is explained
because small depositors are not always able to observe large depositors actions.
Clearly, the previous considerations are just the rst steps toward designing an optimal deposit insurance
scheme that takes into account the degree of observability. We agree that communication channel tra¢ c
needs to be directly measured (Devenow and Welch 1996, p. 612). In their study, Devenow and Welch
(1996) focus on herding behavior in nancial markets and they helped to spark further investigation into the
ways in which observability of actions a¤ect decisions in the equity markets. We think that the same steps
can be followed when analyzing the depositorsbehavior in nancial intermediation.
Although our model incorporates sequential decisions and generalizes the model of Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), we do not consider the case of depositors deciding when to go to the bank. We lack theoretical
models and empirical evidence in this regard. Building models that incorporate timing in the spirit of Gul
and Lundholm (1995) and carrying out lab experiments allowing to choose when to withdraw would be
fruitful areas for future research. Incorporating aggregate uncertainty into the model (e.g., the number of
impatient depositors is unknown, as in Garratt and Keister 2009) is also a nice step for future research in
this area.
References
[1] Andolfatto, David, Ed Nosal, and Neil Wallace. (2007) "The role of independence in the Green-Lin
Diamond-Dybvig Model." Journal of Economic Theory, 137, 709-715.
[2] Arifovic, Jasmina, Janet H. Jiang, and Yiping Xu. (2010) "Bank Runs as Pure Coordination Failures:
Experimental Evidence and Endogenous Evolutionary Learning." Mimeo.
[3] Bruner, Robert F., and Sean D. Carr. (2007) The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Markets
Perfect Storm. John Wiley & Sons.
[4] Calomiris, Charles W., and Joseph R. Mason. (2003) "Fundamentals, Panics and Bank Distress During
the Depression." American Economic Review, 93, 1615-47.
[5] Demirgüc-Kunt, Asli, and Enrica Detragiache. (2002) "Does deposit insurance increase banking system
stability? An empirical investigation." Journal of Monetary Economics, 49, 1373-1406.
[6] Demirgüc-Kunt, Asli, and Harry P. Huizinga. (2004) "Market discipline and deposit insurance." Journal
of Monetary Economics, 51, 375-399.
15
[7] Demirgüc-Kunt, Asli, Edward J. Kane, and Luc Laeven. (2008) Deposit Insurance around the World:
Issues of Design and Implementation. Cambridge, MA:The MIT Press.
[8] Devenow, Andrea, and Ivo Welch. (1996) "Rational herding in nancial economics." European Economic
Review, 40, 603-615.
[9] Diamond, Douglas W., and Phillip H. Dybvig. (1983) "Bank runs, deposit insurance and liquidity."
Journal of Political Economy, 91, 401-419.
[10] Ennis, Huberto M., and Todd Keister. (2009) "Run equilibria in the GreenLin model of nancial
intermediation." Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 1996-2020.
[11] Ennis, Huberto M., and Todd Keister. (2011) "Optimal Banking Contracts and Financial Fragility."
Mimeo.
[12] Fischbacher, Urs. (2007) "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments." Experimental
Economics, 10, 171-178.
[13] Garratt, Rod, and Todd Keister. (2009) "Bank runs as coordination failures: An experimental study."
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 71, 300-317.
[14] Gorton, Gary. (1988) "Banking Panics and Business Cycles." Oxford Economic Papers, 40, 751-781.
[15] Green, Edward J., and Ping Lin. (2003) "Implementing e¢ cient allocations in a model of nancial
intermediation." Journal of Economic Theory, 109, 1-23.
[16] Gu, Chao. (2011). "Herding and Bank Runs." Journal of Economic Theory, 146, 163-188.
[17] Gul, Faruk, and Russell Lundholm. (1995) "Endogenous Timing and the Clustering of AgentsDeci-
sions." Journal of Political Economy, 103, 1039-1066.
[18] Iyer, Rajkamal, and Manju Puri. (2011) "Understanding Bank Runs: The Importance of Depositor-
Bank Relationships and Networks." American Economic Review, forthcoming.
[19] Kelly, Morgan, and Cormac Ó Gráda. (2000) "Market Contagion: Evidence from the Panics of 1854
and 1857." American Economic Review, 90, 1110-1124.
[20] Kiss, Hubert J., Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, and Alfonso Rosa-García. (2009) "Do Social Networks Prevent
Bank Runs?." IVIE Working Papers, Serie AD 2009-25.
16
[21] Klos, Alexander, and Norbert Sträter. (2011) "Level-1 Thinking in an Experimental Bank Run Game."
Working paper, Finance Center Münster.
[22] Madies, Philippe. (2006) "An Experimental Exploration of Self-Fullling Banking Panics: Their Occur-
rence, Persistence, and Prevention." Journal of Business, 79, 1831-1866.
[23] Schotter, Andrew, and Tanju Yorulmazer. (2009) "On the dynamics and severity of bank runs: An
experimental study". Journal of Financial Intermediation, 18, 217-241.
[24] Sprague, Oliver M. (1910) History Of Crises Under The National Banking System. Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing O¢ ce.
[25] Starr, Martha A., and Rasim Yilmaz. (2007) "Bank Runs in Emerging-Market Economies: Evidence
from Turkeys Special Finance Houses." Southern Economic Journal, 73, 1112-1132.
[26] Wicker, Elmus. (2001) The Banking Panics of the Great Depression. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
17
6 Tables
Table	1.	Relative	frequency	of	Bank	Runs	in	each	Treatment
No	Insurance Low	Insurance	(LOW) High	Insurance	(HIGH)Simultaneous 0.841 0.483 0.225
(120) (120) (240)Sequential 0.657 0.214 0.257
(70) (70) (140)
The number of observations appears in brackets. In total, we have 760 observations, each corresponding
to a bank  with 2 experimental subjects (i.e., observations correspond to a total of 1520 decisions).
Treatment
Table	2.	Logit	model	for	the	likelihood	of	bank	runs	in	each	set	up
Coef. Std.	Error Coef. Std.	ErrorLow	Insurance	(LOW) -0.355** 0.052 -0.345** 0.053High	Insurance	(HIGH) -0.606** 0.046 -0.365** 0.063Sequentiality	(SEQ) -0.234* 0.077 . .LOWSEQ -0.050 0.114 . .HIGHSEQ 0.290* 0.099 . .
Log-Likelihood
Pseudo	R 2
Number	of	observations
We have 760 observations which correspond to 1520 decisions. The second column with 250 observations represents the case when we condition  the regression
on the sequential setup. The marginal effects reported in Table 2 are significantly different from zero at **1% or *5% significance level.
760 2800.1735 0.1078
Likelihood	of	Bank	Run
-161.181
(A)	Simultaneous (B)	Sequential	
-424.67886
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